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Human Rights Approach to Intellectual Property
Protection: The Genesis and Application of SubCommission Resolution 2000/7
David Weissbrodt** and Kell Schoff***
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 17, 2000, the United Nations Sub-Commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (the SubCommission) adopted Resolution 2000/7, entitled “Intellectual
Property Rights and Human Rights”.1 This resolution signified
the Sub-Commission’s belief that international intellectual
property regimes were not adequately accounting for human
rights norms.2 Resolution 2000/7 called on U.N. Member
States, intergovernmental bodies, and various U.N. entities to
reaffirm their commitments toward the achievement of
international human rights norms, adopt a human rights
approach to the development of international intellectual
property regimes, and further study the interaction between
intellectual property protection and human rights.3
This article will first examine how the seemingly disparate
interests of trade and globalization, intellectual property
* This article is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu.
** Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; member,
U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.
This article is based on a paper presented at the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS) annual meeting in January, 2003, at a joint program
sponsored by the human rights and intellectual property sections of the AALS.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Dan Burk, Sara Dillon,
Kate Glover, Larry Helfer, Peter Jaszi, Ruth Okediji, and Patricia Schaffer in
preparing this article. This article was also published in volume 22 of the
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights.
*** University of Minnesota Law School, class of 2004.
1. Sub-Commission on Human Rights Res. 2000/7, Intellectual property
rights and human rights, ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess.,
25th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/2000/7 (2000) [hereinafter Resolution
2000/7].
2. Id. at ¶ 2.
3. Id. at ¶¶ 4-15.
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protection, and human rights norms ultimately converged
through the adoption of Resolution 2000/7. It will then review
efforts to modify global trade and finance in light of human
rights concerns, including what steps have been taken by the
U.N. and other international norm-setting institutions in
response to the Sub-Commission’s call for increased awareness
and integration of human rights norms into intellectual
property protection regimes. Finally, it will summarize what
the Sub-Commission hopes will be its next steps in promoting a
human rights approach to international intellectual property
protection and trade liberalization.
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II. ELEMENTS LEADING TO THE ADOPTION OF
RESOLUTION 2000/7
A. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
A brief review of a few key international agreements will
help to frame the rationale behind Resolution 2000/7’s call for
the integration of human rights norms into intellectual
property protection schemes.
1. Human Rights Treaties
In Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),4 the States Parties to the
Covenant “recognize the right of everyone . . . [both] to enjoy
the benefits of scientific progress and its applications”, on the
one hand, and to “benefit from the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author”, on the other.5
Hence, international human rights law recognizes the rights of
inventors and authors while simultaneously focusing on the
public right to benefit from their inventions and works of art.
Article 15 does not, however, indicate how a balance might be
struck between the creators, the economic interests that
acquire their intellectual property, and the beneficiaries of
creativity.6
Nevertheless, the ICESCR does contain several other
provisions bearing upon access to the fruits of inventions. In
Article 11, States Parties to the Covenant “recognize the right
of everyone to an adequate standard of living . . . including
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions.”7 Further, States Parties
recognize in Article 11 “the fundamental right of everyone to be
free from hunger . . . [and accordingly agree to] improve
methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by
making full use of technical and scientific knowledge”.8 In
Article 12, the States Parties to the ICESCR also “recognize the
4. G.A. Res. 2200A , International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
5. Id. at art. 15(1).
6. See id. at arts. 1-31.
7. Id. at art. 11(1).
8. Id. at art. 11(2).
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right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health” that shall be achieved
by the “prevention, treatment and control . . . of diseases” as
well as the “creation of conditions which would assure to all
medical service and medical attention in the event of
sickness.”9
There is another balancing process between the rights of
inventors or owners of inventions under Article 15 and the
rights of the hungry, ill-housed, or the sick who are protected
under Articles 11 and 12. Article 2 of the ICESCR provides
some guidance as to how governments should achieve these
rights. Under Article 2, States Parties only agree to “take
steps . . . to the maximum of available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in” Articles 11, 12, and 15 of the ICESCR.10
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the authoritative interpreter of the ICESCR, has provided
specific guidance on how to implement the general and
potentially conflicting responsibilities of States Parties.11 The
Committee has declared that States Parties have a “minimum
core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least,
minimum essential levels of each of the rights”.12 In particular,
the Committee “emphasize[d] that any intellectual property
regime that makes it more difficult for a State party to comply
with its core obligations in relation to health, food, [or]
education . . . is inconsistent with the legally binding
obligations of the State party.”13 The Committee’s statement
reminded States Parties of the “importance of the integration of
international human rights norms into the enactment and
9. Id. at art. 12(1)-(2).
10. Id. at art. 2(1) (asserting the obligations of States Parties to work for
the full realization of the rights recognized in the Convention).
11. See The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par. 1 of the
Covenant), Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 3, 5th Sess., ¶ 10 (1990) [hereinafter The nature of States parties
obligations], in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 at 18 (2001) [hereinafter Compilation].
See also,
Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Economic and Social
Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 27th Sess.,
Agenda item 3, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (2001) [hereinafter Substantive
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Covenant].
12. The nature of States parties obligations, supra note 11, at ¶ 10.
13. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Covenant,
supra note 11, at ¶ 12.
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interpretation of intellectual property law” in a balanced
manner that protects “public and private interests in
knowledge” without infringing on fundamental human rights.14
A second major human rights treaty relevant to
understanding the nexus between human rights and
intellectual property, particularly with respect to copyright, is
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Civil
and Political Covenant).15 Article 19(2) of the Civil and
Political Covenant provides that “[e]veryone shall have the
right to freedom of expression . . . includ[ing] freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas . . . either orally, in
Article 19(3), however, allows
writing or in print”.16
governments to place substantial restrictions on the broad
rights in Article 19(2) in so far as those limitations are
“provided by law and are necessary . . . [f]or the protection of
national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.”17 Unlike the robust and primary freedom of
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution,18 the heavily restricted freedom of expression
granted by Article 19 of the Civil and Political Covenant affords
much less basis for arguing that freedom of expression should
Nonetheless, it has been
trump or narrow copyright.19
suggested that Article 19 could support an international right
to fair use, just as the First Amendment does in the United
States.20
14. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.
15. G.A. Res. 2200A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Civil and Political Covenant].
16. Id. at art. 19(2).
17. Id. at art. 19(3).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 15, at art. 19.
20. It is unclear, however, whether a prohibition on fair use might
arguably fit within the need to protect “national security or of public order
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.” Civil and Political Covenant,
supra note 15, at art. 19(3). While the concepts of “national security and
public order” have been expansively interpreted in the past couple of years, it
is uncertain whether they could be used as a basis for establishing an
appropriate balance between copyright and freedom of expression. See also
infra section II.A(2) for a discussion on the ordre public clause in the TRIPS
agreement.
There is also a danger in relying too heavily on U.S. precedent pertaining to
fair use and the First Amendment. Two recent copyright cases signal a
narrowing of the scope of protection for expression available under the fair use
doctrine. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, the Second Circuit hinted
at the potential vulnerability of the fair use defense when it noted that “the

6
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Based on language similar to the Civil and Political
Covenant’s Article 19, the European Convention on Human
Rights21 informs a human rights approach to intellectual
property protection. Article 10(1) of the European Convention
on Human Rights recognizes that “[e]veryone has the right to
freedom of expression” which includes “freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers.”22 The freedom of expression, however, is heavily
circumscribed by Article 10(2), which states that “[t]he exercise
of these freedoms . . . may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, [and] for the protection of the reputation or the rights
of others”.23

Supreme Court has never held that fair use is constitutionally required”.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458 (2nd Cir. 2001).
Although the Universal City Studios court conceded that “some isolated
statements in [the Supreme Court’s] opinions might arguably be enlisted for [a
fair use] requirement”, the Second Circuit’s emphatic assertion that “the
DMCA [Digital Millennium Copyright Act] does not impose even an arguable
limitation on the opportunity to make a variety of traditional fair uses of DVD
movies” indicates that U.S. judges are not particularly receptive to fair use
arguments that attempt to invalidate current copyright protection laws. Id. at
458-59.
In Eldred v Ashcroft, the Supreme Court recently confirmed the difficulty of
using fair use as a tool to challenge the constitutionality of federal copyright
legislation. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). In upholding the
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, the Supreme Court
declined to impose the “uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that
incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and safeguards.” Id. at 219.
It reasoned that because the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment to
the Constitution were “adopted close in time . . . copyright’s limited
monopolies are compatible with free speech principles.” Id. The Supreme
Court went on to state that “[t]he First Amendment securely protects the
freedom to make–or decline to make–one’s own speech; it bears less heavily
when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.” Id. at 191.
In light of the narrow scope of fair use seen in Universal City Studios and
Eldred, advocates of a human rights approach to intellectual property rights
should be wary of relying too heavily on U.S. precedent to buttress an
argument for a right to fair use under Article 19 of the Civil and Political
Covenant.
21. The European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe,
(1950), available at http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#C.SecV (last visited
Dec. 2, 2003).
22. Id. at § 1, art. 10(1).
23. Id. at § 1, art. 10(2).
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The Article 10 freedom of expression argument was
recently raised in an unsuccessful challenge to English
copyright law. In Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd.,24 a
newspaper publisher that had printed verbatim excerpts from a
politician’s personal diaries attempted to avoid liability for
copyright infringement by arguing that the Article 10 freedom
of expression trumped the copyright protection provided by the
English Copyright, Patents and Designs Act (CPDA).25 The
English Court of Appeal rejected that contention, reasoning
that, because “[t]he needs of a democratic society include the
recognition and protection of private property . . . [which]
includes copyright[,]” there was “no reason why the provisions
of the [CPDA] should not be sufficient to give effect to the
Convention [Article 10] right subject only to such restrictions
as are permitted by Article 10.2.”26 Although Article 10
protection for freedom of expression did not control in this
particular case, the Court of Appeal nonetheless acknowledged
the following:
[R]are circumstances can arise where the right of freedom of
expression will come into conflict with the protection afforded by the
[CPDA], notwithstanding the express exceptions to be found in the
[CPDA]. In these circumstances, we consider that the court is
bound . . . to apply the [CPDA] in a manner that accommodates the
right of freedom of expression.27

This dictum indicates that courts may in some contexts
take human rights norms into account when ruling on
intellectual property litigation.28
2. International Intellectual Property Protection: The TRIPS
Agreement
In adopting Resolution 2000/7, the Sub-Commission
expressed a fundamental concern that the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property29 does not
24. The Right Honourable Paddy Ashdown MP PC v. Telegraph Group
Ltd.,
2001
EWCA
Civ.
1142
(Eng.
C.A.)
available
at
http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/judgmentsfiles/j677/civil_ashdown.htm
(last
visited Dec. 2, 2003).
25. Id. at ¶ 15.
26. Id. at ¶ 38.
27. Id. at ¶ 45.
28. For more extensive discussion of the Ashdown case and its
implications, see generally Louis Joseph, Human Rights Versus Copyright: The
Paddy Ashdown Case, 13 ENT. L. REV. 72 (2002); Amos Merris, Can We Speak
Freely Now? Freedom of Expression under the Human Rights Act, 6 EUR. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 750 (2002).
29. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
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adequately recognize human rights norms.30 Resolution 2000/7
reads in part:
Noting . . . that actual or potential conflicts exist between the
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of
economic, social and cultural rights in relation to, inter alia,
impediments to the transfer of technology to developing countries, the
consequences for the enjoyment of the right to food of plant variety
rights and the patenting of genetically modified organisms, “biopiracy” and the reduction of communities’ (especially indigenous
communities’) control over their own genetic and natural resources
and cultural values, and restrictions on access to patented
pharmaceuticals and the implications for the enjoyment of the right
to health,
....
Declares . . . that since the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement
does not adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility
of all human rights . . . there are apparent conflicts between the
intellectual property rights regime embodied in the TRIPS
Agreement, on the one hand, and international human rights law, on
the other.31

Since TRIPS is such a central focus of the SubCommission’s concern, it is appropriate to present a brief
overview of the TRIPS Agreement. The Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights was a product
of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade (GATT) held in 1994.32 Broadly speaking, TRIPS
extended intellectual property rights by endowing the World
Trade Organization (WTO) with the power to impose reciprocal
trade sanctions.33 TRIPS requires that WTO States protect
intellectual property by enacting national legislation and
regulatory procedures.34
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO], Annex 1C; LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement],
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27trips.pdf. (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
30. Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, at preface & ¶ 9.
31. Id. at preface & ¶2.
32. ROBERT P. MERGES ET. AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 319-20 (2d ed. 2000).
33. The preface of TRIPS outlines a desire to “reduce distortions and
impediments to international trade . . . [by] taking into account the need to
promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights,
and . . . ensur[ing] that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.”TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 29, at preface. It also recognizes the need for “new
rules and disciplines concerning . . . the provision of effective and appropriate
means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights.” Id.
34. “Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement.”
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TRIPS recognizes that nations will have different policy
goals with respect to the scope of intellectual property
protection depending on their respective levels of
Article 7 notes that “protection and
development.35
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to
the promotion of technological innovation”.36 At the same time,
this protection should also contribute to the “social and
economic welfare”.37 Article 8 explicitly mentions that WTO
States may take into account the protection “of public health
and nutrition, and . . . promot[ion of] the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development” when tailoring their intellectual
property regimes to the norms mandated by TRIPS.38 These
provisions reveal a fundamental tension in TRIPS between the
economic interests of intellectual property rights holders, on
the one hand,39 and state and public interests in promoting
public health and economic development, on the other.40
This tension is reiterated in the specific context of patent
protection in TRIPS Articles 27, 28, 30, and 31.41 Article 28
forms the general rule extending exclusive protection to patent
Article 27, however, permits governments to
holders.42
“exclude from patentability” any inventions in order to “protect
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at art. 1.1. “Members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this
Agreement within their own legal system and practice.” Id.
35. TRIPS prefaces its substantive articles with a recognition of “the
special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum
flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to
enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.” TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 29, at preface.
36. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at art. 7.
37. Id.
38. “Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological development, provided that such measures are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.” TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 29, at art. 8.1.
39. The patent protection system in most developed countries typically
encourages innovation by providing an economic incentive, in the form of a
limited term monopoly on the production and sale of the patentable subject
matter. In the United States, this policy is rooted in the text of the
Constitution, which authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of . . .
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right
to their . . . Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
40. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at arts. 8, 27 & 28.
41. See id. at arts. 27, 28, 30 & 31.
42. Id. at art. 28.1(a).
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ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
Furthermore, Article 30 describes broad
environment”.43
parameters within which it is acceptable for member states to
intrude on the exclusivity of patent rights:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.44

Article 31 specifies the threshold conditions and limitations
that must be satisfied if a State wishes to derogate from the
exclusivity of the patent protection afforded by Article 28.45
Before allowing the use of the subject matter of a patent
without the authorization of the patent holder, a government
must first attempt to “obtain authorization from the right
holder on reasonable commercial terms.”46 This requirement,
however, can be waived “in the case of national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
non-commercial use.”47 Even if such exigent circumstances
exist, however, the government must limit “the scope and
duration of such use . . . to the purpose for which it was
authorized”.48 Furthermore, such use is to be “terminated if
and when the circumstances which led to . . . [the unauthorized
use] cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.”49 Hence, Articles
30 and 31 frame the balance of interests between intellectual
property rights of patent holders, Member States, and the
public at large.
TRIPS’ copyright protection primarily guards the copyright
interests of literary and artistic creators from developed
nations.50 Gaps exist in the copyright protection provided for
artistic and literary manifestations of traditional knowledge
and indigenous culture.51 TRIPS incorporates Articles 1-21 of
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
43. Id. at art. 27.2.
44. Id. at art. 30.
45. Id. at arts. 28 & 31.
46. Id. at art. 31(b).
47. Id.
48. Id. at art. 31(c).
49. Id. at art. 31(g).
50. See generally Srividhya Ragavan, Vol. 2 No. 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 1 (2001) (describing protection of traditional knowledge and indigenous
culture).
51. See id. at 17-19.
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Works52 as the basis for TRIPS copyright protection.53 The
language of the Berne Convention does provide some protection
for works that encompass traditional knowledge and
indigenous culture.54 Significantly though, TRIPS does not
include the rights and obligations under Berne Convention
Article 6bis, which confers moral rights upon copyright
holders.55 The refusal to recognize moral rights of authors
partially explains why some indigenous artists have difficulty
in protecting their creations from undesirable modifications or
Furthermore, the remaining TRIPS copyright
uses.56
provisions focus on rights involving computer programs,
cinematographic works, sound recordings, and broadcasting.57
These TRIPS provisions are more valuable to copyright holders
in developed nations than to literary and artistic creators
seeking to protect traditional knowledge and indigenous
cultural rights.
Intellectual property protection under TRIPS benefits from
the enforcement mechanism of the WTO. Under this system,
when disputes are raised under WTO law by a government
52. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Paris Act of July 24, 1971, as amended on Sept. 28, 1979,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/index.html [hereinafter Berne Convention].
53. WTO Agreement, supra note 29, at art. 9.1.
54. The Berne Convention provides copyright protection for “literary and
artistic works,” which include “every production in the literary, scientific and
artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such
as . . . works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and
lithography”. Berne Convention, supra note 52, at art. 2.1.
55. Berne Convention Article 6bis reads in part:
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
Berne Convention, supra note 52, at Article 6bis.1.
56. Upon reading a working draft of this article, one scholar noted:
While it’s true that [indigenous authors] sometimes have difficulty
protecting their works under established intellectual property
doctrines, this relates to broader issues than moral rights. In
particular, differing conceptions of ownership and differing
understanding[s of] the desirability of claiming exclusive rights often
underlie the inadequacy of protection. Thus, even if TRIPS were
amended to protect moral rights, many indigenous authors would still
face these same difficulties.
Comments of Professor Laurence R. Helfer, Loyola Law School (Los Angeles,
CA) (Jan. 2003) (copy on file with author). For a further discussion of
problems involving intellectual property protection of indigenous rights, see
generally infra part II.B.
57. See WTO Agreement, supra note 29, at arts. 10-14.
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seeking examination of the legality of a national measure, the
result is a binding decision addressing the validity of the
national regulation.58 If the complaining nation prevails, it
may then place retaliatory tariffs on goods from the defending
country.59
3. Dealing with Differences and Overlaps Between Human
Rights Law and TRIPS
As compared with the robust sanctions-based enforcement
mechanism of TRIPS within the WTO, human rights treaties
have modest implementation procedures. Both the Human
Rights Covenants require that States Parties report
periodically on their progress in achieving the rights in the
respective treaties.60 These reports are reviewed by 18-member
treaty bodies elected by the States Parties.61 The treaty bodies
conclude their reviews of state reports by issuing concluding
comments in which issues are raised and recommendations are
made.62 When the government needs to make a further report,
usually after a couple of years, these concerns should be the
subject of attention. The Human Rights Committee also has
the capacity to adjudicate complaints from the individual
residents of the 104 nations that have ratified the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.63 However, Committee decisions are not considered to
be binding.64 Indeed, human rights norms are principally
58. See THE WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENTS 18-27 (1999) (discussing dispute settlement through the WTO).
59. See id. at 23-24 (“For a government found at fault in a dispute, the
possibility of [tariffs as the] ultimate sanction of retaliation is undoubtedly a
strong inducement to settle the matter by withdrawing the offending measure
or by giving compensation.”); see also G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and
International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization,
44 DUKE L.J. 829, 832 (1995) (discussing the WTO dispute resolution system).
While it can be argued that sovereign states can still ignore a WTO ruling, the
cost associated with retaliatory tariffs, and the threat that such a decision
poses to the viability of the entire WTO system and the world export economy
militate against such a response. See THE WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 58,
at 24 (discussing retaliation measures).
60. See ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 16 & 17; see also Civil and Political
Covenant, supra note 15, at art. 40.
61. See, e.g., Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 15, at art. 28.
62. See id. at art. 40.
63. See G.A. Res. 2200A, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 59, art.
1, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
Optional Protocol].
64. See id. at art. 5(4) (considering Committee decisions as “views”
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implemented at the international level by persuasion and
embarrassment rather than sanctions.65 Hence, there is an
imbalance in the way international obligations are effectuated
under TRIPS and human rights treaties.
A related problem posed by the creation of the WTO with
its incorporation of TRIPS is its failure to address any conflicts
that arise under international law when a country has ratified
treaties that may differ with its obligations under the WTO. A
nation cannot generally absolve itself of its obligations under
one treaty by ratifying a second treaty later.66 In a situation in
which there is a potential conflict, the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties calls for the interpretation of the two
treaties so as to give effect to both.67 It might be argued that
WTO law, including TRIPS, qualifies as lex specialis. However,
that argument would not exempt nations from their human
rights obligations and would not prevent human rights treaty
bodies from assessing the human rights implications of
intellectual property measures.68 Hence, despite the stronger
without requiring action by the State Party).
65. See DAVID WEISSBRODT & TERESA O’TOOLE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 17, 25 (Human Rights, the United
Nations and Amnesty International 1988); see also DAVID WEISSBRODT, ET.
AL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 10-11 (3rd
ed. 2001) (discussing the rare availability of sanctions).
66. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(Jan. 24, 1980) at art. 30(4) (discussing the obligations of countries that are
not all parties to an earlier treaty) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. In the
unlikely situation in which all the parties to both treaties are the same,
however, and the two treaties relate to the same subject matter, the first
treaty may be considered amended by the second treaty. Id. Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, “when all the parties to [an] earlier treaty
are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or
suspended in operation . . . the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its
provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.” Id. at art. 30(3).
Hence, the later treaty is controlling where there is a conflict, and so is treated
as an amendment to the earlier treaty. See id.
67. “When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be
considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of
that other treaty prevail.” Vienna Convention, supra note 66, at art. 30(2). To
the extent that the treaties are compatible, then, each is given effect. At least
one WTO Panel Report acknowledges that States Parties must seek
interpretations that avoid violating both treaties. See Indonesia – Certain
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, Report of the Panel on Indonesia,
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DR59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998) (stating that
“under public international law there is a presumption against conflicts”).
68. Although the WTO is a specialized agency established under Article
57 of the U.N. Charter, that provision does not give the WTO superior legal
powers. The U.N. Charter protects human rights in Articles 1, 55, and 56.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (citing human rights as a purpose of the U.N.); U.N.
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implementation procedures of the WTO, governments are
obligated to seek interpretations of both TRIPS and the human
rights treaties that would avoid violating either treaty regime.
The WTO has given short shrift to human rights norms
when deciding conflicts in the dispute resolution system. The
WTO Dispute Settlement Panels and Appellate Body are
primarily focused on scrutinizing the legality of national
measures under GATT/WTO law.69 They are not required to
balance various sectors of national or international law with
trade law.70 Further, the WTO dispute resolution system has
CHARTER art. 55 (calling for observance of human rights without regard to
race, sex, language, or religion); U.N. CHARTER art. 56 (calling for joint and
separate action under Article 55). Further, under Article 103, the U.N.
Charter should be considered controlling. See U.N. CHARTER art. 103
(indicating that in case of conflict between obligations under the Charter and
another international agreement, those under the U.N. Charter should
prevail). The authority for establishment of specialized agencies under Article
57 of the Charter does not diminish the impact of Articles 1, 55, 56, and 103.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 57 (establishing agencies subject to acceptance by the
General Assembly as discussed in Article 63).
69. The Dispute Settlement Panels handle disputes under “covered
agreements”, which include only GATT/WTO law: the agreement establishing
the WTO, multilateral trade agreements, and plurilateral trade agreements.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, App. 1., 33 I.L.M. 1244 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding]. The
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body cannot “add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided” in the covered WTO agreements and human rights
instruments are not among the WTO agreements. Id. at art. 3(2).
70. Id. at art. 1 (stating that the agreement covers the documents listed in
Appendix I, but not mentioning any balancing of national concerns). One
could argue that some aspects of human rights law, such as the prohibition of
genocide and slavery, constitute jus cogens and would thus prevail over
contrary provision of WTO law. But there is very little agreement as to which
principles qualify as jus cogens, so that argument would probably not broaden
the jurisdiction of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body or the qualifications of
its members.
One scholar has noted, however:
[T]here is some indication from the Shrimp/Turtle case, Report of the
Appellate Body, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) that WTO
jurists are willing to consider not only non-trade treaties but also nontrade soft law when interpreting WTO agreements.
In
Shrimp/Turtle, the Appellate Body concluded that the phrase
“exhaustible natural resources” was an “evolutionary” concept to “be
read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of
the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the
environment. Those concerns, in turn, were reflected not only in
treaties regulating natural resources but also in nonbinding
“declarations” addressing that topic. A similar approach might be
applied to “evolutionary” terms in TRIPS (especially the open-ended
phrases in Articles 7 and 8), giving them a meaning that takes into
account human rights norms endorsed by the international
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been criticized for its lack of transparency and openness to
input from amici curiae and other procedures for
knowledgeable input from outside the trade field.71 Therefore,
the imbalance in the way international obligations are realized
under TRIPS and the human rights treaties was a significant
motivating factor in the Sub-Commission’s decision to adopt
Resolution 2000/7.
B. GAPS IN PROTECTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, INDIGENOUS
CULTURE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Alleged violations of indigenous cultural property rights
attained visibility during the 1990s, before the immediate
impetus for the adoption of Resolution 2000/7 arose. Three
examples of indigenous cultures clashing with intellectual
property regimes indicate why the Sub-Commission felt
compelled to advocate human rights protection of traditional
knowledge as part of its resolution.
The first two examples illustrate the insufficiency of
copyright schemes to protect Aboriginal Australian cultural
interests adequately. In the first case, an Aboriginal artist
named Terry Yumbulul created an artifact called a Dreaming
Star Pole, which represents where one’s soul goes after death.72
The artifact is sacred to the Aborigines, and Mr. Yumbulul had
to undergo initiation rights in order to be allowed to create the
community.
Comments of Professor Helfer, supra note 56.
Professor Helfer also noted that imbalances between TRIPS and human rights
treaties seen in the context of enforcement and implementation procedures
extend to substantive norms as well: “Particularly in the case of economic,
social and cultural rights . . . [the human rights] treaties articulate norms at
relatively high levels of generality as compared to the precise and detailed
rules that TRIPS imposes. Id.; c.f. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at art. 30
(dealing with patents). “It is hard to see a conflict between these treaty
provisions because Article 12 is quite general in scope.” Comments of
Professor Helfer, supra note 56. Helfer goes on to note, however, that conflicts
do emerge upon consideration of the Economic and Social Committee’s General
Comments. Id. For discussion of the Economic and Social Committee’s
General Comments, see infra part IV.D.
71. See Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,
EUR. J. INT’L L. 17-18 (forthcoming 2003) (noting the effort of the Appellate
Body to call for amici curiae briefs in the E.C.- Asbestos case, the criticism of
that request by WTO Members, and the response of the Appellate Body in the
US - Certain E.C. Products decision).
72. Symposium, Global Intellectual Property Rights: Boundaries of Access
and Enforcement, Panel II: The Law and Policy of Protecting Folklore,
Traditional Knowledge, and Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753, 760 (2002).
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artifact.73 Mr. Yumbulul assigned the copyright on the artifact
to an agent,74 who then passed reproductions of the artifact to
the Reserve Bank of Australia, which used the image on an
Australian bank note.75 Mr. Yumbulul brought suit76 against
the Reserve Bank in an attempt to prevent distribution of the
notes, which the clan considered a blasphemous use of their
sacred image.77
The High Court of Australia court ruled in favor of the
Bank, on grounds that the copyright had been validly
The court, however, noted that Australia’s
assigned.78
copyright law might not “provide adequate recognition of
Aboriginal community claims to regulate the reproduction and
use of works which are essentially communal in origin”, but
declined to provide relief because “the question of
statutory recognition of Aboriginal communal interests in the
reproduction of sacred objects is a matter for consideration by
law reformers and legislators.”79
The second Australian copyright case concerned the use of
an Aboriginal painting as a template for a design woven into
Vietnamese-manufactured carpets.80 The painting, displayed
in the National Gallery of Australia, depicts a story of the
Dreamtime.81 The use of a sacred image as a decoration on
which to walk was considered highly offensive by the artists
and their clan.82 The artists, on behalf of the clan,83 sued to
73. Id. at 761.
74. Probably for use in promoting societal knowledge of Aboriginal culture
in educational settings. See Michael Blakeney, Milpurrurru and Ors v.
Indofurn Pty. and Ors-Protecting Expressions of Aboriginal Folklore Under
Copyright Law, 2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV. ELECTRONIC J. OF LAW 1 (1995),
available at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n1/blakeney21.html.
75. See id.
76. Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia, (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481 (Austrl.).
77. See Blakeney, supra note 74, at 2 (referencing criticism of Yumbulul
by the Aboriginal community for the offensive use).
78. Yumbulul, 21 I.P.R. at ¶ 23.
79. Blakeney, supra note 74, at 2 (citing Yumbulul and discussing the
inadequacy of copyright law in protecting expressions of Aboriginal folklore).
80. Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd., (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240 (Austl.).
81. The Dreamtime is the Aboriginal collection of folklore concerning the
creation of the world; and virtually all Aboriginal artwork depicting stories of
the Dreamtime are semi-sacred. Symposium, Global Intellectual Property
Rights, supra note 72.
82. Milpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. at ¶ 18.
83. Aboriginal custom holds that the Dreamtime stories are passed down
through tribal custodians. The right to create depictions of the Dreamtime is
similarly passed down from artist to artist. These custodians act as the
keepers of the clan’s knowledge on behalf of their people. Blakeney, supra
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enjoin the use of the image, alleging cultural harm suffered by
the clan as a whole.84 The High Court of Australia tried to
compensate the Aborigines for the cultural harm they suffered,
awarding damages to each of the living artists for “flagrant”85
copyright infringement.86 Nonetheless, the court refused to
award damages to the clan as a whole because Australian
copyright law did not provide a remedy for the alleged
infringement of a collective ownership right.87
The Yumbulul and Milpurrurru cases highlight gaps in the
protection of indigenous rights under existing copyright law
regimes. Both cases turn in part on the problem of establishing
authorship.88 Many indigenous peoples claim a collective right
of ownership, or alternatively assert that styles of art have
been passed down from generation to generation.89 Such
assertions raise issues of standing to bring suit, and duration of
protection to be conferred.90 Furthermore, even in cases like
note 74, at 5.
84. Milpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. at ¶ 12.
85. Australian law allows for increased compensatory damages for
copyright infringement in cases where the infringement was executed with
“total disregard not only for the legal rights of the plaintiff regarding copyright
but for his feelings and his sense of family dignity and pride.” Williams v.
Settle, 1 W.L.R. 1072, 1082 (1960) (Eng. C.A.). In the Milpurrurru case, it was
established that the Aboriginal depictions had been designated for educational
display only, and that the artists had indicated that use of the images on
carpets would be highly offensive to themselves and their clan. Milpurrurru,
54 F.C.R. at ¶¶ 13–16.
86. Each artist was awarded Australian $15,000 to “reflect the harm
suffered . . . in their cultural environment.” Blakeney, supra note 74, at 4.
87. The Milpurrurru court stated that “[t]he statutory remedies do not
recognise the infringement of ownership rights of the kind which reside under
Aboriginal law in the traditional owners of the dreaming stories and the
imagery such as that used in the artworks of the present applicants.”
Milpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. at ¶ 127. See Blakeney, supra note 74, at 5 (noting
that Australian copyright law provides remedies for infringement in
proportion to the economic damage caused by the infringement, and further
noting that it was untenable to think that the court could quantify the extent
of economic damage to the Aboriginal cultural right).
88. Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia, (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481, ¶ 21
(Austrl.); Blakeney, supra note 74, at 2.
89. Yumbulul, 21 I.P.R. at ¶ 21.
90. Many copyright regimes require a specific, identifiable author, or at
least some identifiable entity that created the subject matter, in order to
confer copyright protection. Blakeney, supra note 74, at 5. Since an entire
indigenous clan or regional population generally does not participate in the
creation of a particular artifact, there is a question of who exactly has suffered
a legal harm for which they can pursue a legal remedy. Furthermore, in cases
where indigenous peoples claim that the original depictions were created by
ancestors thousands of years ago, most copyright systems provide scant
protection, since the original author’s life and limited term of protection has
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Milpurrurru where courts do provide a remedy, it usually takes
the form of monetary compensation.91
In many cases,
pecuniary gain could never fully compensate for the cultural
harm suffered in these situations, and does little to deter future
offenses.92
The cultural harms suffered in the Milpurrurru and
Yumbulul cases implicate rights guaranteed under the
ICESCR. Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR recognizes the right of
everyone “to take part in cultural life”, and Article 15(1)(c)
recognizes the right of everyone “[t]o benefit from the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the
author.”93
The third traditional knowledge case, which received
greater publicity, related to the validity of a patent on an
extract from the oil of an Asian tree.94 The neem tree is
indigenous to the Indian subcontinent.95 Neem bark has been
used for centuries as a traditional medicine, insecticide and
fungicide.96 The pharmaceutical manufacturer W.R. Grace Co.
initially obtained a patent97 from the European Patent Office
(EPO) on the fungicidal properties of a neem oil extract, and
then cheekily tried to sell the patented product on the Indian
market.98 Upon appeal by the Green Party of the European
Parliament and an Indian nongovernmental organization
(NGO), the EPO revoked the patent on grounds that it did not
qualify as a novel invention in light of the traditional use of
neem bark in Indian society.99 The EPO’s revocation of a
patent on neem tree oil extract was a rare victory for
traditional scientific knowledge over modern patent schemes.100
long since expired. Id.
91. Milpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. at ¶ 166.
92. Blakeney, supra note 74, at 4.
93. ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 15.
94. Karen Hoggan, Neem tree patent revoked, BBC NEWS ONLINE, May 11,
2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/745028.stm.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. European Patent No. EP0436257 (issued July 10, 1991).
98. Symposium, Global Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 72, at 765.
99. Hoggan, supra note 94.
100. Besides increasing public awareness of the grave risks that
corporations would unjustly exploit indigenous and traditional knowledge, the
neem tree case raised three additional points of interest. First, the U.S. Dept.
of Agriculture was a co-applicant with W.R. Grace for the neem oil patent. See
Hoggan, supra note 94. Hence, the U.S. government contributed to and
encouraged exploitation of traditional knowledge under current intellectual
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Responding to concerns arising from cases like the neem
tree, Milpurrurru, and Yumbulul, Sub-Commission member
Dr. Erica-Irene A. Daes has advocated the protection of
indigenous cultural and property rights.101 As Chairperson and
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission’s Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, Dr. Daes was the principal author of
the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.102
This Draft Declaration103 called for the broad recognition and
respect for indigenous peoples’ rights, including cultural and
intellectual property rights.104 Dr. Daes continued to campaign
property regimes. Second, the plaintiffs in the revocation action argued that,
in addition to non-novelty, Grace’s patent should be revoked as “against public
morality.” Decision Revoking European Patent No. EP0436257, European
Patent Office (Feb. 13, 2001) (available from European Patent Office; on file
with editor) (European Patent Convention (Jan. 2000) Art. 53 reads in part:
“[P]atents shall not be granted in respect of inventions the publication or
exploitation of which would be contrary to [the public order] or morality”).
Although the EPO declined to rule on that question, the fact that the
argument was brought at all signals a move towards using human rights
arguments as a means of combating unfair intellectual property
determinations. Similar arguments could be advanced in future patent
disputes in the context of TRIPS, which contains a “public morality” article
similar to the one in the European Patent Convention. See WTO Agreement,
supra note 29, at art. 27.2. “Members may exclude from patentability
inventions, the prevention of which within their territory . . . is necessary to
protect ordre public or morality.” Id. Third, the EPO revoked the neem tree oil
patent in part because the European Parliament’s Green Party advocated the
patent appeal. In the absence of influential and knowledgeable allies like the
Greens, indigenous peoples may lack the resources to raise successful
objections to the appropriation of their traditional knowledge by wealthy
corporations.
101. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Equality of Indigenous Peoples Under the
Auspices of the United Nations-Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 493 (1995).
102. Id. at 494.
103. Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Working
Group on Indigenous Populations on its eleventh session, U.N. ESCOR,
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 45th Sess., Agenda item 14,
annex I, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (1993) [hereinafter Draft
Declaration]. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has referred the draft
Declaration to its Working Group on the Draft United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, where it has been under consideration since
1989. Daes, supra note 102, at 494.
104. Article 29 reads:
Indigenous peoples are entitled to the recognition of the full
ownership, control and protection of their cultural and intellectual
property.
They have the right to special measures to control, develop and
protect their sciences, technologies and cultural manifestations,
including human and other genetic resources, seeds, medicines,
knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions,
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for indigenous peoples’ interests,105 emphasizing that U.N.
Member nations must not only recognize the existence of
indigenous peoples’ rights, but also enact national legislation
providing stringent substantive and jurisdictional protection of
those rights.106
Dr. Daes’ Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the
Heritage of Indigenous Peoples indicates how indigenous rights
can be more effectively protected.107 Collective ownership and
custodial ownership created through initiation procedures
should be recognized and incorporated into national legal
systems.108 Patent and copyright protection for indigenous
knowledge should be available only after the traditional
owners’ free and informed consent has been secured.109 States
should create prompt and effective judicial measures to allow
traditional owners to “prevent, punish and obtain full
restitution and just compensation” for unlawful acquisition or
use of their cultural heritage.110 In addition, “[b]usiness and
industry should ensure they have . . . free and informed consent
of indigenous peoples when entering into agreements for the
rights to . . . use previously undescribed [sic] species or
cultivated varieties of plants, animals or micro-organisms, or
Moreover, “[a]ny
naturally occurring pharmaceuticals.”111
literatures, designs and visual and performing arts.
Draft Declaration, supra note 103, at art. 29.
105. After preparing the 1993 Draft Declaration, supra note 103, Dr. Daes
wrote Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of
Indigenous Peoples in 1995. Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples:
Protection of the heritage of indigenous people, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on
Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, 47th Sess., Provisional Agenda item 15, at annex I,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (1995) [hereinafter Principles and
Guidelines]. She also chaired a revision of those Principles and Guidelines in
2000. See Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Seminar on the
draft principles and guidelines for the protection of the heritage of indigenous
people, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 52nd Sess.,
Provisional Agenda item 7, at annex I, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/26 (2000)
[hereinafter Seminar on Principles and Guidelines].
106. Erica-Irene Daes, Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples, 95
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 143, 150 (2001) (calling for “strengthening [of]
transboundary jurisdictions of national courts to enforce private international
law and . . . ensuring international respect for the customary intellectual
property laws of indigenous peoples as a matter of choice of law”).
107. See Seminar on Principles and Guidelines, supra note 105, at annex 1.
108. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15 & 24.
109. Id. at ¶¶ 23(a), 23(c).
110. Id. at ¶ 23(b).
111. Id. at ¶ 36
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agreement should ensure that the indigenous peoples
concerned continue to be primary beneficiaries of commercial
Further, “[i]ndigenous peoples and their
application.”112
representative organizations should . . . participate in[] all
intergovernmental discussions and negotiations in the field of
intellectual property rights, to share their views on the
measures needed to protect their heritage through
international law.”113 These guidelines address many of the
inadequacies of intellectual property protection for traditional
heritage highlighted in Yumbulul,114 Milpurrurru,115 and neem
tree cases.116 Ultimately, since legal regimes often provided
inadequate protection for indigenous peoples’ knowledge,
culture, and human rights, the Sub-Commission explicitly to
refer to these concerns as a motivating factor for the adoption
of Resolution 2000/7.117
C. THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE
REALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Sub-Commission indicated that the negative effect of
globalization on human rights was another motivating factor
for the adoption of Resolution 2000/7.118 Specifically, the SubCommission relied on reports from two Special Rapporteurs, as
well as from its working group on transnational corporations,
to support a request for “[g]overnments and national, regional
112. Id. at ¶ 36. By explicitly referencing indigenous rights to plants,
animals, and micro-organisms, the Seminar on Principles and Guidelines echo
a major theme espoused within the Convention on Biological Diversity of 1992.
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 16 U.N.T.S. 229, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/BIO.Div/N7 – INC.5/4 (1992). A product of the 1992 Earth Summit,
the Convention on Biological Diversity seeks to encourage sustainable use of
the components of biodiversity, and to share the benefits of such use in a fair
and equitable way. The neem tree case and the debate over the use of
terminator technology in agriculture, see supra section II.B and infra section
II.C, are examples of biodiversity exploitation addressed by the Convention on
Biological Diversity. Resolution 2000/7 indicated that the Convention on
Biological Diversity was a motivating factor in the Sub-Commission’s decision
to adopt Resolution 2000/7. See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1. Further
information about the Convention on Biological Diversity, as well as the text
of
the
Convention,
see
http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/FaoInfo/Agricult/AGP/AGPS/pgrfa/pdf/cbde.pdf
(last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
113. Seminar on Principles and Guidelines, supra note 105, at ¶ 51.
114. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 94-100 and accompanying text.
117. Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 1-16.
118. Id.
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and international economic policy forums to take international
human rights obligations and principles fully into account in
international economic policy formulation”.119 Because the
Sub-Commission explicitly referenced these globalization
reports as supporting their decision to adopt Resolution 2000/7,
it is appropriate to examine those reports briefly.
1. The Special Rapporteurs’ Preliminary Report
J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama, SubCommission Special Rapporteurs on globalization and its
impact on the full enjoyment of human rights, submitted a
preliminary report to the Sub-Commission two months before
the adoption of Resolution 2000/7.120 The Special Rapporteurs’
report began by reminding the Sub-Commission that
globalization is not a purely economic phenomenon that is
divorced from human values and policy decisions.121 Instead,
the report contended that “[t]he boundaries within which the
market operates are defined politically, in direct negotiations
between governments in multilateral forums, such as the
World Trade Organization.”122 By asserting that political
decisions shape the path of globalization, the Special
Rapporteurs indicated that some human rights problems can be
ameliorated at their source, by modifying the political decisions
that enable globalization.123
The report critiqued the World Trade Organization (WTO)
for contributing to increasing global inequality and
discrimination.124 It also characterized the WTO structure and
its assumptions about global trade as being heavily biased in
favor of transnational corporations and developed nations.125
119. Id. at ¶ 4.
120. J. Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama, The Realization of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment
of human rights, ESCOR, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, 52d Sess., Provisional Agenda item 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (2000) [hereinafter Special Rapporteurs’ Report].
121. Special Rapporteurs’ Report, supra note 120, at ¶¶ 1-5.
122. Id. at ¶ 7 (citing Fernando Enrique Cardoso, Globalization and
International Relations, Public Address to the South African Institute of
International Affairs in Johannesburg (Nov. 26, 1996) at 5-6).
123. See Special Rapporteurs’ Report, supra note 120, at ¶¶ 7-10.
124. See id. at ¶¶ 13-19.
125. “Indeed, the assumptions on which the rules of WTO are based are
grossly unfair and even prejudiced. Those rules also reflect an agenda that
serves only to promote dominant corporatist interests that already monopolize
the arena of international trade.” Special Rapporteurs’ Report, supra note
120, at ¶ 14.
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While the WTO can be fairly characterized as democratic in
form (since it allows one vote per member and purports to use
consensus decision-making),126 in practice the WTO has
operated unfairly to less-developed nations, which are often
denied participation in policy-making decisions.127 Therefore,
the report called for the WTO’s deliberative and policy-setting
procedures to be made more transparent, and more receptive to
developing nations.
The Special Rapporteurs’ report also disapproved of the
WTO’s intellectual property protection system,128 positing that
the TRIPS’ guarantee of the patentability of plant varieties and
life forms was a legal and economic usurpation.129
Furthermore, the Special Rapporteurs recommended that if the
WTO truly desired a commitment to a balanced trade
liberalization scheme, it would embrace a dialogue of inclusion
for developing nation concerns.130
2. The Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities
of Transnational Corporations
One further precursor of Sub-Commission Resolution
2000/7 arose in the context of the Sub-Commission’s study and
drafting of obligations that transnational corporations and
other business enterprises owe to human rights.131 In its
126. Id. at ¶ 16.
127.
[W]hether one considers the dispute settlement procedures, the
mechanisms for implementing agreements or the areas selected for
negotiations, one comes to realize that the WTO structure is heavily
tilted in favour of developed countries, such that developing countries
are, de facto, kept away from decision-making mechanisms and from
policy-making; similarly, their own specific problems are not
sufficiently taken into account.
Special Rapporteurs’ Report, supra note 120, at ¶ 16 (citing Anne-Christine
Habbard and Marie Guirand, The World Trade Organization and Human
Rights, International Federation of Human Rights, Position Paper (November
1999)).
128. See supra section II.A(2).
129. Special Rapporteurs Report, supra note 121, at ¶ 18.
130. “[The WTO] must not only include intellectual property protections of
interest to the developed countries, but also address issues of current or
potential concern for developing countries, such as property rights for
knowledge embedded in traditional medicines, or the pricing of
pharmaceuticals in developing country markets.” Special Rapporteurs’ Report,
supra note 120, at ¶ 19 (citing Joseph F. Stiglitz, Trade and the Developing
World: A New Agenda, CURRENT HISTORY 387 (November 1999)).
131. E.S.C. Res. 1998/8, The relationship between the enjoyment of
economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development, and the
working methods and qctivities of transnational corporations, ESCOR,
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resolution 1998/8 of 20 August 1998 the Sub-Commission
decided “to establish, for a three-year period, a sessional
working group of the Sub-Commission, composed of five of its
members, taking into account the principle of equitable
geographical distribution, to examine the working methods and
activities of transnational corporations.”132 The first meeting of
the Working Group in 1999 requested preparation of a draft
code of conduct for transnational corporations.133 While the
first draft code of conduct did not contain a provision on
intellectual property and human rights, a more recent
document134 produced by members of the Working Group tracks
Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement.135
The development of genetically modified “terminator” seeds
in the late 1990s was a clear example of questionable corporate
behavior that motivated the adoption of Sub-Commission
Resolution 2000/7.
Terminator technology enables seed
suppliers to create strains of crop seeds that are incapable of
reproducing.136 Agribusiness companies “stood to make huge
profits from the technique since it meant that farmers could not
continue holding over seeds produced in one growing season for
use in the next - a widespread practice in most developing
countries.”137 Although many other agricultural companies
were also developing genetically modified seeds, the Monsanto
Corporation became the target of widespread public concern
over the anticipated sales of sterile seeds in the markets of
developing nations.138 The international furor eventually led
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/4, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/45 (1998).
132. Id. at ¶ 4.
133. See The Realization of Economic Social and Cultural Rights: Report of
the sessional working group on the working methods and activities of
transnational corporations on its first session, ESCOR, Commission on Human
Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
51st Sess., at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/9 (1999).
134. Human Rights Principles and Responsibilities for Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: With Commentary on the
Principles, ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/WG.2/WP.1/Add.2 (2002).
135. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at art. 7 (specifying the objectives of
protecting intellectual property).
136. Danielle Knight, Cheers for Monsanto’s Reversal on “Terminator”,
PRESS
SERVICE,
Oct.
5,
1999,
available
at
INTER
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/cheers-cn.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
137. Id.
138. In fact, at the time Monsanto promised not to market sterile seed
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Monsanto to pledge that it would not commercialize the
terminator technology that creates sterile seeds.139 Although
Monsanto’s declaration heralded a significant victory for
developing countries, critics of terminator technology were
quick to note that the dangers of genetic manipulation of seeds
had by no means vanished.140 At the time of its announcement
not to market sterile seeds, Monsanto was believed to have 87
other terminator patents pending in developing countries,141
including one for a genetic modification that would “make a
seed not germinate unless exposed to a certain chemical.”142
Other major agribusinesses were pursuing similar patents for
technology that could be used to control various “developmental
processes in plants - including germination, sprouting,
flowering and fruit ripening.”143 The potentially devastating
effect that such technology could have on developing nations’
agricultural sectors typified the concerns that motivated the
Sub-Commission to create the Working Group on the methods
and practices of transnational corporations, and was a
significant factor in the Sub-Commission’s decision to adopt
Resolution 2000/7.144
III. THE GENESIS AND ADOPTION OF SUB-COMMISSION
RESOLUTION 2000/7
As the preceding section of this article shows, human
rights concerns had been expressed with regard to intellectual
property protection and global trade before the SubCommission adopted Resolution 2000/7. The Sub-Commission,
technology, it did not yet possess the rights to that specific technique. The
technology was jointly developed by the USDA and Delta and Pine Land
Company, a smaller business that Monsanto was attempting to take over. See
Terminator gene halt a ‘major U-Turn’, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Oct. 5, 1999,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/465222.stm (last visited Jan. 31,
2003); see also Knight, supra note 136.
139. Knight, supra note 136.
140. Id.
141. John Vidal, World braced for terminator 2, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 6,
1999.
142. Knight, supra note 136.
143. Id.
144. See Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human
rights: Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted in
accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/32, ESCOR,
Commission on Human Rights, 58th Sess., Provisional Agenda item 10, at ¶¶
21, 34, 43, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/54 (2002).

26

MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1

however, had a more immediate catalyst for Resolution 2000/7
and its call for a human rights approach to devising
international intellectual property protection and global trade
regimes.
In late July 2000, a Lutheran World Fund
representative145 named Peter Prove submitted to the SubCommission a joint statement by three NGOs.146
This
statement urged the Sub-Commission to “take concrete action
on TRIPS . . . [by] reassert[ing] the primacy of human rights
obligations over the commercial and profit-driven motives upon
which agreements such as TRIPS are based.”147 The statement
specifically called attention to human rights implications of
economic globalization, TRIPS’ acceptance of biopiracy, and
TRIPS’ stringent protection of TNC interests with respect to
technology transfers.148
Issues of globalization, indigenous rights protection, and
TNC behavior had been separately mentioned for years before
Prove submitted the joint statement.149 Nonetheless, the SubCommission had not taken any action in regard to TRIPS and
international intellectual property protection.150 Prove found
an ally in Asbjørn Eide, a Norwegian member of the SubCommission.151 Eide proposed a resolution criticizing existing
international intellectual property regimes.152 Because no one
anticipated the proposal, there was little opposition to Eide’s

145. The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) is an international
organization of Lutheran churches that provides humanitarian assistance in
troubled areas of the world, and advocates for greater awareness of human
rights. See generally http://www.lutheranworld.org. Peter Prove is an LWF
representative and is a well-respected NGO advocate at the Sub-Commission.
146. The statement was submitted to the Sub-Commission by Habitat
International Coalition, the International NGO Committee on Human Rights
in Trade and Investment [hereinafter INCHRTI], and the Lutheran World
Federation. The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Joint
written statement submitted by Habitat International Coalition and the
Lutheran World Federation, non-governmental organizations in special
conservative status, ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess. Provisional
Agenda item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/NGO/14 (2000) [hereinafter
Joint HIC/LWF Stmt.].
147. See Joint HIC/LWF Stmt., supra note 146, at 6.
148. See id. at 4-6.
149. Prof. Weissbrodt is a member of the Sub-Commission and was present
at these events.
150. See Joint HIC/LWF Stmt., supra note 146, at 4-6.
151. Id.
152. Id.

2003]

A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH

27

resolution expressing human rights concerns about TRIPS.153
This lack of opposition, combined with the Sub-Commission’s
awareness of the related problems presented by globalization
and indigenous rights, helped Eide to push international
intellectual property protection onto the Sub-Commission’s
agenda.154
Although the Sub-Commission softened its tone somewhat
in comparison to the forceful language of the NGO statement,
the actions urged by Resolution 2000/7 were nonetheless a
significant set of propositions. Referencing Daes’ work on
indigenous cultural rights, problems highlighted in the
globalization report,155 and “actual or potential conflicts . . .
between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the
realization of economic, social and cultural rights”,156 the
resolution made the following requests: (1) that governments
give primary consideration to human rights objectives when
crafting national policy and legislation pertaining to
intellectual property; (2) that intergovernmental organizations
provide similar integration of human rights principles into
their policies and practices; (3) that the WTO in particular take
human rights obligations into account when reviewing the
TRIPS Agreement; and (4) that various U.N. bodies (including
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR), the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the
Secretary-General) take further measures to analyze the
human rights impacts of the TRIPS Agreement.157
IV. REACTIONS TO RESOLUTION 2000/7
If the relationships between international intellectual
property protection, globalization, and human rights had not
been particularly visible before the summer of 2000, they
certainly were subjected to more detailed scrutiny after the
Sub-Commission adopted Resolution 2000/7.
The SubCommission’s resolution generated responses from U.N. bodies,
intergovernmental organizations, and governments.

153.
154.
155.
156.
II.A(2).
157.

Id.
Id.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, at preface; see also supra Part
See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 3-15.
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A. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER’S REPORT ON TRIPS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
Pursuant to the Sub-Commission’s request, the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) submitted a report
on the impact of TRIPS on human rights. The HCHR’s report
undertook a two-step analysis. First, the report assessed the
degree to which TRIPS was compatible with a human rights
approach to intellectual property protection.158 Second, to the
extent that TRIPS did not comport with human rights
standards, the report made recommendations for implementing
flexibility within the TRIPS Agreement that would foster a
more human rights-oriented approach to international
intellectual property protection.159
The HCHR determined that as currently implemented,
TRIPS was not fully compatible with human rights objectives.
First, the HCHR noted that “the overall thrust of the TRIPS
Agreement is the promotion of innovation through the
provision of commercial incentives. The various links with the
subject matter of human rights . . . are generally expressed in
terms of exceptions to the rule rather than the guiding
principles themselves”.160 Second, TRIPS explicitly details
intellectual property rights, but refers only to general
responsibilities of intellectual property holders.161 The HCHR
indicated that, for States parties to both TRIPS and ICESCR,
the balance of interests identified in TRIPS Article 7162 might
not be sufficient to meet its human rights obligations under
ICESCR.163 Third, the HCHR noted that the TRIPS-imposed
158. The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights on human rights: Report of the High Commissioner, ESCOR,
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess., Provisional Agenda item 4, ¶ 15,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001) [hereinafter High Commissioner’s
TRIPS Report].
159. See id. at ¶¶ 60-69.
160. Id. at ¶ 22.
161. Id. at ¶ 23.
162. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
163. ICESCR Article 15 delineates a need to balance protection of the
interests of intellectual property holders and the public. In this respect,
ICESCR is similar to TRIPS Art. 7. However, the HCHR noted that ICESCR
Art. 15 must be read in conjunction with ICESCR Art. 5, which holds that
nothing in ICESCR can justify any act aimed at the destruction of any of its
rights or freedoms or to limit a right beyond what is provided for in ICESCR.
High Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, see supra note 158, at ¶ 13. Hence,
ICESCR may well require greater obligations to realize human rights than
does TRIPS Art. 7.
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obligation “to provide protection for all forms of technology has
an impact on States’ ability to decide on development
strategies.”164 These limitations originate from similar policies
in industrialized countries and do not necessarily coincide with
In addition, some
objectives of developing nations.165
developing nations lack the requisite infrastructure to
implement the developed nation policies mandated by
TRIPS.166 Further, the HCHR noted that TRIPS contained no
provisions for the protection of cultural heritage and
indigenous rights.167
In light of these shortcomings the High Commissioner
made a series of recommendations.168 First, States should
monitor TRIPS implementation through national legislation to
ensure that it meets the human rights standards detailed in
the ICESCR.169 Second, the HCHR encouraged States to
modify their intellectual property regimes to provide protection
for indigenous community interests.170 Third, States should
pass legislation that ensured access to essential drugs, so as to
protect the right to the highest available standard of health.171
Fourth, the High Commissioner suggested that TRIPS Article 7
be amended to include an explicit reference to human rights.172
Finally, the High Commissioner encouraged the SubCommission to continue examining the interaction of
intellectual property rights and other human rights.173

164. High Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, supra note 158, at ¶ 24.
165. Id. at ¶ 25.
166. See id. at ¶¶ 24-5.
167. Id. at ¶ 26.
168. Id at ¶¶ 59-70.
169. See id. at ¶ 61.
170. See id. at ¶ 65.
171. A large portion of the High Commissioner’s Report was devoted to an
analysis of whether TRIPS left sufficient room for States to address public
health issues; Brazil’s approach to its national AIDS crisis was one focus of
this discussion. For a more detailed discussion of the Brazil case, see infra
notes 187-194 and accompanying text.
The High Commissioner’s Report determined that TRIPS does allow for States
to enact legislation allowing compulsory licensing and parallel importation of
drugs in times of public health emergency.
As a result, the High
Commissioner recommended that States pass national legislation securing
those privileges. High Commissioner’s TRIPS report, supra note 158, at ¶ 66.
172. High Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, supra note 158, at ¶ 68.
173. The High Commissioner’s recommendations can be found in High
Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, supra note 158, at ¶¶ 59-70.
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B. THE WTO/WIPO RESPONSE
The WTO and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) were surprised by and did not agree with
Resolution 2000/7’s criticisms. Both organizations stated that
the tension between rights of intellectual property holders and
the public interest was “complementary rather than mutually
exclusive”,174 and that TRIPS Article 7 adequately reflected
this complementary tension. With respect to drug access, the
organizations contended that Article 8’s recognition of States’
interest in “protecting health”,175 coupled with Article 31’s
provisions for limited exceptions to the exclusivity of patent
protection,176 sufficiently enabled States to address their public
health concerns.177
The WTO acknowledged that many
national intellectual property regimes did not provide
comprehensive protection for traditional knowledge.178
Nonetheless, the WTO thought that TRIPS mandated complete
protection of traditional knowledge, and that gaps in coverage
might be better filled by national legislation rather than by a
retooling of TRIPS itself.179 In short, the WTO and WIPO did
not concur with the Sub-Commission’s conclusion that TRIPS
conflicted with human rights objections.
C. STATE RESPONSES
Echoing the WTO/WIPO positions, the European
Commission also asserted that TRIPS adequately provided for
174. Intellectual property rights and human rights: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess., Provisional Agenda
item 4, § II.B.2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12 (2001). The SecretaryGeneral’s report consisted of reactions to Resolution 2000/7 from various
nations, NGOs, and intergovernmental bodies that were submitted to the
Secretary-General. Section II(B) of this document contained the WTO’s
response. Id. at § II.B.1-13. Responses from other organizations were
included in a separate document. See generally Intellectual property rights
and human rights: Report of the Secretary-General, Addendum, ESCOR,
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess., Provisional Agenda item 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12/Add.1 (2001) [hereinafter Addendum] (providing that
the Secretary-General received additional replies, including one from WIPO).
175. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
177. Intellectual property rights and human rights: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, supra note 174, at ¶ 10; see also Addendum supra note 174, at ¶¶ 812.
178. Intellectual property rights and human rights: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, supra note 174, at ¶¶ 11-13.
179. Id.
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the realization of human rights. Like the WTO and WIPO, the
Commission thought that TRIPS Article 7 struck an
appropriate balance of interests.180 The Commission reiterated
that TRIPS principles should not allow patenting of traditional
knowledge.181 The Commission noted that TRIPS does not
speak directly to the issue, but believed that this silence
provided States with enough leeway to enact legislation specific
to traditional knowledge if they so desired.182 The Commission
also encouraged the creation of traditional knowledge
databases and the inclusion in all patent applications of the
geographic origin of any biological material in order to reduce
conflicts in instances like the “neem tree oil” case.183
The European Commission did not believe that TRIPS
needed to be altered in order to enable States to address public
health concerns.184 The Commission thought that developing
nations and the international community should concentrate on
preventing disease, fostering drug distribution mechanisms,
and building health care infrastructures, rather than
pressuring large pharmaceutical companies to provide cheap
medicines.185 The Commission also voiced concerns about any
provisions that deny intellectual property protection, arguing
that rigorous patent protection is necessary in order to provide
pharmaceutical companies with an incentive to continue
research and development programs.186
Unlike the European Commission, some States believed
that affordable medicine constituted a crucial step in promoting
public health. The most visible test of TRIPS’ mandates came
from Brazil, whose 1997 decision to enact compulsory licensing
legislation enabled generic production of internationally

180. Submission to the United Nations Secretary General from the Services
of the European Commission with Regard to Resolution 2000/7and the
Request for a Report on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, at ¶ 7,
(July 31, 2001).
181. Id. at ¶ 23.
182. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.
183. Id. at ¶¶ 23-24.
184. Id. at ¶ 12, 31.
185. Id. at ¶ 12. The Commission also indicated a concern that providing
cheap drugs could lead to problems with parallel importation. When a
pharmaceutical company engages in differential pricing based on the
purchasing power of a given market, it runs the risk of selling drugs cheaply
to a poor nation that may turn around and re-sell the product to a nation with
greater purchasing power. Id. at ¶ 13. This problem would leave the poor
nation with no drugs and reduce the pharmaceutical company’s profits.
186. Id. at ¶ 14.

32

MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1

patented AIDS drugs.187 Although contentious at the time,
Brazil’s acts have generally been considered a stunning public
health success. Within four years of initiating its compulsory
licensing program, Brazil reduced its AIDS death rate by 50%,
while simultaneously reducing per capita expenditures on
pharmaceuticals.188 Indeed, the High Commissioner’s TRIPS
Report, discussed above, praised the Brazilian government for
“implementing the public health safeguards in the TRIPS
Agreement” in a way that “has successfully married
implementation of the Agreement with its obligations under
human rights law”.189
The United States contested Brazil’s compulsory licensing
program. In January 2001, the United States requested the
establishment of a WTO dispute resolution panel, alleging that
Brazil’s compulsory licensing law violated U.S. patent holders’
rights guaranteed by TRIPS.190 The U.S. subsequently agreed
to drop the WTO suit, provided that Brazil consult with the
U.S. government if Brazil intended to implement compulsory
licensing in the future.191
The United States’ decision to drop its complaint was
influenced by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights’ April 23,
2001, adoption of a resolution supporting Brazil’s compulsory
licensing program. Commission Resolution 2001/33 called upon
States to “pursue policies . . . which would promote . . . [t]he
availability in sufficient quantities of pharmaceuticals . . . used
to treat pandemics such as HIV/AIDS”.192 To that end, the
187. Decreto No. 9.279, de 14 de Mayo de 1996, D.O. de 15.05.1996. Article
68 of this law authorized the government to provide for compulsory licensing
where a patent holder exercises patent rights in an abusive manner, and in
cases of national emergency or public interest. These provisions mimic the
TRIPS’ compulsory licensing provision outlined in Article 31.
High
Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, see supra note 158, at ¶ 55.
188. High Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, supra note 158, at ¶ 57. Brazil
also saw an 80% decrease in hospitalization due to opportunistic diseases that
so often afflict AIDS patients. The Brazilian Ministry of Health reduced its
drug expenditure from $336 million to $319 million between 1999 and 2000,
yet also managed to deliver drugs to an additional 12,000 patients during that
same 12-month span. Local production of generic drugs has cut production
costs by an average of 70% since the inception of the compulsory licensing
program.
189. Id. at ¶ 58.
190. See Brazil - Measures Affecting Patent Protection: Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/ DS199/3 (Jan.
9, 2001).
191. Brazil - Measures Affecting Patent Protection: Notification of Mutually
Agreed Solution, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/4 (July 19, 2001).
192. Commission on Human Rights Res. 2001/33, Access to medication in
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Commission encouraged States to “adopt legislation . . . to
safeguard access to such preventative, curative or palliative
pharmaceuticals or medical technologies from any limitations
by third parties”.193 Furthermore, the Commission called on
States to “refrain from taking measures which would deny or
limit equal access for all persons to such . . . pharmaceuticals
and medical technologies”.194 This resolution endorsed Brazil’s
compulsory licensing program, and discouraged aggressive
pharmaceutical patent protection such as the U.S. complaint
pending with the WTO at the time.195 The U.S. abstention
constituted the only opposition to the otherwise unanimous
adoption of Commission Resolution 2001/33.
A scenario similar to the US-Brazil dispute took place
when the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South
Africa sued the South African government in South Africa’s
Constitutional Court.196 The pharmaceutical manufacturers’
alleged that an amendment to South Africa’s patent laws
infringed on the manufacturers’ property rights and conflicted
The
with
TRIPS-mandated
patent
protection.197
the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, ESCOR, Commission on Human
Rights, 57th Sess., 71st mtg., ¶ 2(a) U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/33 (2001)
[hereinafter Commission on Human Rights Res. 2001/33], available at
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2001/documentation/commission/2001-33.htm
(last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
193. Id. at ¶ 3(b).
194. Id. at ¶ 3(a).
195. See id. at ¶¶ 3-4.
196. Notice of Motion, Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr. v. President of the
Republic of S. Afr., Case No. 4183/98 (High Court of South Africa 1998)
available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharmasuit.html (last visited
Nov. 14, 2003).
197. The Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, No.
90 of 1997, gave the South African Health Minister power to define
“prescribed conditions” for the supply of “more affordable medicines” in
“certain circumstances.” See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr., at ¶ 2.1. One
practical effect of the Amendment Act was to give the Health Minister the
power to enact parallel importation of patented drugs. See Sarah Joseph,
Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The “Fourth Wave” of
Corporate Human Rights Scrutiny, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 425, 442 (2003). The
amendment also gave the Health Minister the power to prescribe conditions
under which compulsory licenses could be granted. See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of
S. Afr., at ¶ 2.2. The South African government already had the ability to
grant compulsory licenses pursuant to the Patents Act of 1978. Joseph at 442.
The Amendment Act, however, increased the discretion of the government to
determine the conditions under which compulsory licenses would be granted.
See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr., at ¶¶ 2.1 & 2.2.
The pharmaceutical manufacturers alleged that Amendment Act authorized
the government to deprive pharmaceutical patent holders of their intellectual
property, or to appropriate that property without providing compensation. See

34

MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1

pharmaceutical manufacturers settled their suit in April 2001,
in light of the South African government’s agreement to consult
a pharmaceutical working group before implementing its new
laws.198 The pharmaceutical group’s decision to drop their
complaint was likely prompted in part by strong global protest
to the suit. The Commission on Human Rights’ impending
adoption of Resolution 2001/33 (which endorsed Brazil’s
compulsory licensing program) and Sub-Commission Resolution
2000/7 may also have contributed to the decision to drop the
South African suit.199
D. RESPONSE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS
Three months after the adoption of Sub-Commission
Resolution 2000/7, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights held a day of discussion in November 2000 to
consider whether TRIPS potentially conflicts with human
rights norms in the ICESCR.200 The day of discussion was
Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr., at ¶ 2.3. Such a taking was alleged to violate
Section 25 of the South African Constitution, which states that “[p]roperty
may be expropriated only . . . for a public purpose or in the public interest, and
subject to compensation”. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, Act 108
of
1996,
Chapter
2,
§
25,
part
2
(1996),
available
at
http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/ constitution/saconst.html (last visited Oct.
23, 2003). Further, the pharmaceutical manufacturers alleged that the
parallel importation authorization violated TRIPS’ Article 27 prohibition on
discrimination with respect to importation or local production of patented
products. See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr., at ¶ 2.4.
198. The Minister of Health agreed to invite a working party from the
pharmaceutical industry to consult with the government in formation of
policies, legislation, and regulations that would be enacted to implement the
Amendment Act. The government, however, made explicit mention of TRIPS’
allowance for the adoption of measures necessary to protect public health and
broaden access to medicines. Joint Statement of Understanding Between the
Republic of S. Afr. and the Applicants, in the matter between: The Pharm.
Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr. v. The President of the Republic of S. Afr., ¶ 2 (April 19,
2001), available at http://www.efpia.org/3_press/20010419.htm (last visited
Oct. 23, 2003).
199. The South African pharmaceutical manufacturers settled their suit on
April 19, 2001. The Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution
2001/33 on April 23, 2001. Commission on Human Rights Res. 2001/33, supra
note 192. It seems plausible to think that the pharmaceutical manufacturers
were tracking the buildup to Resolution 2001/33’s adoption, and understood
that a U.N. endorsement of compulsory licensing would reflect badly on the
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ suit.
200. Report on the Twenty-second, Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth
Sessions, ESCOR, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22nd24th Sess., Supp. No. 2, ¶ 578, U.N. Doc. E/2001/22 and E/C.12/2000/21 (2000)
[hereinafter Report on the 22-24 Sessions].
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intended to lay a foundation for the eventual adoption of a
general comment on the relationship between intellectual
property rights and human rights standards.201
The discussion relied heavily on a discussion paper
prepared by Audrey Chapman, a representative of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science.202 Peter
Prove, the LWF lobbyist who provided the initial impetus for
the Sub-Commission to consider adopting Resolution 2000/7,
also contributed to the discussion.203 In addition, background
papers and commentary on cultural property and traditional
knowledge rights played a prominent part in the discussion.204
Chapman’s presentation to the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights stated that the creation of the WTO
and TRIPS had strengthened the world intellectual property
regime in a way that was inconsistent with human rights
norms.205 She further stated that the international intellectual
property regime had “demonstrated detrimental effects to the
rights enshrined in [ICESCR].”206 She specifically noted that
the current intellectual property regime did not apply to
indigenous creations and knowledge, negatively affected the
right to health by reducing the availability of pharmaceuticals,
and threatened the right to food by extending broad plant
patent protection to a few agricultural companies that hold

201. Id. at ¶ 579.
202. Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right: Obligations
Related to Article 15(1)(c), ESCOR, Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 24th Sess., Provisional Agenda item 3, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/12 (2000) (discussion paper submitted by Dr. Audrey R.
Chapman).
203. Report on the 22-24 Sessions, see supra note 200, at ¶ 629. Also
present was Miloon Kothari, representing the International NGO Committee
on Human Rights in International Trade and Investment. (INCHRITI.) Id. at
¶ 630. That NGO was one of groups that jointly presented the statement to
the Sub-Commission that eventually resulted in the adoption of Resolution
2000/7. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
204. Background papers were submitted by a Swiss scholar and by the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission. Protection of cultural
property: an individual and collective right, ESCOR, Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 24th Sess., Provisional Agenda item 3, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/16 (2000) (background paper submitted by Patrice Meyer-Bisch);
Protecting the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional
knowledge, ESCOR, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 24th
Sess., Provisional Agenda item 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/17 (2000)
(background paper submitted by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission).
205. Report on the 22-24 Sessions, supra note 200, at ¶ 587.
206. Id.
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patents on the genomes of important global crops.207 The
Economic and Social Committee’s Chairperson concluded the
discussion by reiterating the Committee’s intent to draft a
general comment on intellectual property and human rights.208
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
has not yet adopted a General Comment yet. Instead, the
Committee drafted a less visible and less ambitious statement
that outlines their concerns about the effect of intellectual
property regimes on key human rights principles derived from
ICESCR.209 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights stated that intellectual property has “a social function”
and “should serve the objective of human well-being, to which
international
human
rights
instruments
give
legal
expression.”210 In addition, “[h]uman rights are fundamental,
inalienable and universal entitlements . . . whereas intellectual
property rights . . . are instrumental . . . generally of a
temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to
someone else.”211 The Committee also asserted that “[w]hile
the State holds the primary duty to respect, protect and fulfil
[sic] human rights, other actors, including non-State actors and
international organizations, carry obligations, which must be
subject to scrutiny.”212
The Committee elaborated on the most important
obligations imposed by ICESCR. While acknowledging that
ICESCR allows for “progressive realization” of some of the
ICESCR’s objectives, the Committee reminded States parties of
“various obligations which have immediate effect, including
core obligations.”213 Core obligations require States parties to
“‘ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum
essential levels of each of the rights’ enunciated in
[ICESCR]”.214 In particular, the Committee “emphasize[d] that
any intellectual property regime that makes it more difficult for
a State party to comply with its core obligations in relation to
207. Report on the 22-24 Sessions, supra note 200, at ¶ 587.
208. Id. at ¶ 635.
209. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Covenant,
supra note 11, at ¶ 2.
210. Id. at ¶ 4.
211. Id. at ¶ 6 (citing High Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, supra note 158,
at ¶ 14).
212. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Covenant,
supra note 11, at ¶ 10.
213. Id. at ¶ 11.
214. Id. at ¶ 12 (citing The nature of States parties obligations, supra note
11).
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health, food, [or] education . . . is inconsistent with the legally
binding obligations of the State party.”215
In addition to States’ core obligations in relation to health,
food, and education, the Committee noted that ICESCR “sets
out the need to balance the protection of public and private
interests in knowledge.”216 As the Committee explained:
On the one hand, article 15.1(a) and (b) [of ICESCR] recognizes the
right of everyone to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits
of scientific progress and its applications. On the other hand, Article
15.1(c) recognizes the right of everyone to benefit from the protection
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author.217

The Committee urged States to “strike a balance between
those concurrent Covenant provisions” in developing
intellectual property regimes.218 The Committee referenced
with approval the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, which “recognizes that intellectual property
protection is important for the development of new medicines,
but at the same time also recognizes the concerns about its
effect on prices.”219
In summary, the Committee’s statement reminded States
parties of the “importance [of] the integration of international
human rights norms into the enactment and interpretation of
intellectual property law” in a balanced manner that protects
public and private interests in knowledge without infringing on

215. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Covenant,
supra note 11, at ¶ 12. Article 11 of the International Covenant recognizes a
right to food. See infra part IV.E.1; see also Committee’s General Comment No.
12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), U.N. Commission on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 29th Sess., at ¶ 1 (1999).
Article 12 of the International Covenant recognizes the right to the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health. See Committee’s General
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art.
12), U.N. Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22nd Sess., at
¶¶ 1-2 (2000).
Article 13 of the International Covenant recognizes the right to education,
which shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. See Committee’s General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education
(Art. 13), U.N. Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 21st
Sess., at ¶¶ 1-2 (1999).
216. Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Statement of the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, 27th Sess., Agenda Item 3, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15
(2001).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. For further discussion of the Doha Declaration, see infra part V.
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fundamental human rights.220 When close questions arise
about where the appropriate balance lies, States should draw a
balance that maintains the integrity of human rights.
E. CONTINUING EFFORTS OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
1. Report on Globalization
The High Commissioner’s Report on the impact of TRIPS
on human rights, discussed at Section IV(A) above, was the
first of a triad of reports, prompted by the Sub-Commission’s
resolution and proposed by the Office of the High
Commissioner, concerning human rights and trade. The second
report examined the impact of globalization on the enjoyment
of human rights by outlining issues that arise when “the
liberalization of agricultural trade is viewed from a human
rights perspective.”221 Specifically, the report examined the
implementation of the 1994 WTO Agreement on Agriculture to
highlight some of the problems stemming from the
liberalization of agricultural trade.
The High Commissioner’s report reminded WTO States of
their obligations under international human rights
instruments. In particular, the report noted that all WTO
States are subject to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and that 112 of the 144 WTO States have ratified
ICESCR.222 Both instruments recognize the right of everyone
to have an adequate standard of living, which includes the
right to food.223 Article 2 of ICESCR binds parties to “take
steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation . . . with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant”.224
Article 28 of the Universal Declaration states that “[e]veryone
220. Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Statement of the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 216, at ¶ 18.
221. Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights:
Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted in accordance
with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/32, ESCOR, Commission
on Human Rights, 58th Sess., Provisional Agenda item 10, at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2002/54 (2002).
222. Id. at ¶ 10.
223. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), at
art.
25,
U.N.
Doc.
A/810
(1948),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/index.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2003); see also
ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 11.
224. ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 2.
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is entitled to a social and international order in which the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully
realized.”225 By reminding WTO States of their obligations
under these instruments, the High Commissioner’s report
indicated that WTO States have a binding obligation to protect
and promote the right to food, even as they seek to liberalize
trade in agriculture.226
The High Commissioner’s report concluded that the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) generates both positive and
negative human rights results. On the positive side, the AoA
increases transparency and accountability in international
agricultural trade, which the High Commissioner characterized
as an “important first step . . . towards a more fair
international trading system.”227
The High Commissioner’s report also highlighted some of
the potential human rights issues that might arise as a result
of global trade liberalization in agriculture.
First,
liberalization has encouraged farm consolidation.228 Although
this trend has increased productivity and competition, it has
also marginalized small farmers and farm laborers, and
exposed communities to increases in food prices.229 Second,
trade liberalization has forced some developing countries into a
chronic system of net food importation. The resultant payment
imbalances could eventually hinder developing nations’ ability
to realize their right to development.230 Third, agricultural
price fluctuations created by trade liberalization could
negatively impact some nations’ ability to finance development,
or even affect a state’s ability to guarantee availability of
225. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 223, at art. 28.
226. See Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human
Rights: Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 221, at
¶ 10.
227. Id. at ¶ 27; cf ¶¶ 34-39 (demonstrating the negative affects of
liberalization).
228. Id. at ¶ 35.
229. Id. For example, the High Commissioner’s Report references a U.N.
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) study that showed an adverse effect
of agricultural trade liberalization on 300,000 potato and onion farmers in Sri
Lanka. The same study indicated that consolidation of Brazilian dairy farms
were squeezing out traditional cooperatives. Id. (citing Agriculture, Trade and
Food Security Issues and Options in the WTO Negotiations from the
Perspective of Developing Countries, FAO Commodities and Trade Division,
Country Case Studies, Vol. II, at 25 (2000)).
230. See Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human
Rights: Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 221, at
¶ 37.
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food.231
2. Report on Liberalization of Trade in Services
In the summer of 2002, the Office of the High
Commissioner submitted the final report in its tripartite
examination of the interaction of trade and human rights. The
report focused on the human rights effect of liberalization of
trade in services.
In the same way that its report on
globalization used a specific agreement (the AoA) as a case
study, the High Commissioner’s report on trade in services
examined the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
The report again reminded WTO States of their obligations
under ICESCR and the Universal Declaration to promote the
right to food. The report also noted the right to development.232
Since liberalization of trade in services encompasses a wider
range of activities than agricultural trade services, the report
extended the scope of State obligations to include the rights to
health, education, water, and labor.233 The High Commissioner
characterized States as the “duty bearer[s] for human
rights,”234 and therefore asserted that States have an
affirmative obligation to (1) monitor the realization of human
rights, (2) develop domestic trade policies that promote human
rights objectives and (3) regulate extra-national third party
activities that affect human rights in the State.235
The
High
Commissioner’s
report
stressed
that
liberalization of trade in services can provide a positive effect
on human rights.236 But, the report also noted that the
liberalization of trade in services, without adequate
governmental regulation and proper assessment of its effects,
can also have undesirable effects.237 Therefore, “[t]he key

231. Id. at ¶ 38.
232. See supra notes 222-226 and accompanying text.
233. Liberalization of Trade in Services and Human Rights: Report of the
High Commissioner, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, 54th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9 (2002).
234. Id. at ¶ 10.
235. To this end, the High Commissioner encouraged State ministries and
agencies to conduct human rights assessments that would promote popular
participation and consultation with the people affected by trade liberalization.
The High Commissioner also advocated for increased “transparency and
accountability” with respect to the methods of assessment and trade
negotiations. Id. at ¶¶ 10-13.
236. Id. at ¶ 39.
237. Id.
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question from a human rights perspective is not whether
liberalization does or does not promote human rights; rather, it
is how to determine the right form and pace of liberalization to
ensure the protection of human rights and how to reverse
policies that are unsuccessful.”238 The report indicated that
effective state regulation and oversight, buttressed by
international assistance to developing countries, is integral to
controlling the pace and form of liberalization.239
The High Commissioner noted with approval GATS’
recognition of the principle of non-discrimination.240 In the
context of trade law, non-discrimination means equal
treatment for national and foreign service providers alike. The
non-discrimination principle can be extended, however, to
encompass the human rights view of non-discrimination in
terms of race, color, sex, etc.241 The High Commissioner also
endorsed GATS’ exceptions for the purposes of protecting public
morals, as well as human, animal and plant life, and the
protection of individual privacy.242
V. PROGRESS
Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7 encouraged a series of
investigations into the human rights implications of
international intellectual property protection and trade
liberalization. The heightened global awareness about the
human rights implications of intellectual property and global
trade has produced some positive results. Most significantly,
the WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha in November 2001
responded to several of those human rights concerns.
The Ministerial Conference adopted a special declaration
238. Id. at ¶ 50.
239. Id.
The High Commissioner specifically stressed the need for
regulation that would implement effective competition policies and corporate
transparency, as well as national policies reflecting a commitment to providing
universal service. The High Commissioner stated that “[i]n human rights
terms, the need to regulate . . . is in fact a duty to regulate . . . to ‘fulfil’ [sic]
human rights requires States to take appropriate legislative, administrative,
budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the full realization of such
rights.” Id. (emphasis added).
240. Id. at ¶ 59.
241. Id.
242. Id. at ¶ 63. The High Commissioner noted that these protections are
“familiar themes to human rights law”, and stated that although “a human
rights approach would place the promotion of human rights at the centre of
the objectives of GATS rather than as permitted exceptions, these links
nonetheless provide an entry point for a human rights approach to
liberalization”. Id.
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that explicitly addressed the issue of the interaction of TRIPS
and public health concerns. The declaration stated that “the
[TRIPS] Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.”243 To that end, the declaration reminded
WTO States that TRIPS recognizes the right to grant
compulsory licenses, as well as the ability to implement
Furthermore, the
parallel importation mechanisms.244
declaration noted that “public health crises, including those
relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency.”245 It is these circumstances
which enable States to initiate compulsory licensing under
TRIPS Article 31.246
The Ministerial Conference’s declaration instructed the
Council for TRIPS (a TRIPS review body) to take into account
the issues pertaining to traditional knowledge and folklore
when
reviewing
TRIPS’
exclusivity
requirements.247
Furthermore, the declaration stated that “special and
differential treatment for developing countries shall be an
integral part of . . . enabl[ing] developing countries to
effectively take account of their development needs, including
food security and rural development.”248 In addition, the
declaration recognized the “particular vulnerability of the leastdeveloped countries and the special structural difficulties they
face in the global economy,” and committed the WTO to
“addressing the marginalization of least-developed countries in
international trade and to improving their effective
participation in the multilateral trading system.”249 Further,
the declaration noted that “under WTO rules no country should
be prevented from taking measures for the protection of
human, animal or plant life or health . . . subject to the
requirement that they . . . are otherwise in accordance with the
243. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Doha
Ministerial Conference, 4th Sess., at ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (015860)
(2001),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm
(last visited Oct. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration].
244. Id. at ¶ 5(b) and (d).
245. Id. at ¶ 5(c).
246. WTO, supra note 29, at art. 31.
247. Ministerial Declaration, supra note 243, at ¶19.
248. Id. at ¶ 13.
249. Id. at ¶ 3.
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provisions of the WTO Agreements.”250 The declaration also
reaffirmed the right of WTO members to regulate the supply of
services under GATS,251 and confirmed the WTO’s
responsibility to make its operations transparent and
democratic.252
The United States’ initial responses to the Doha
Declaration’s objectives have been mixed. With respect to trade
liberalization, the United States submitted to the WTO a
proposal suggesting the removal of international regulatory
procedures for financial and insurance services, and also
recommended
lowering
trade
restrictions
in
the
telecommunications, energy, and environmental services.253 In
addition, the Bush administration promised to contribute $1
million to the “Doha Development Agenda Trust Fund, [which]
aim[s] at building the capacity for developing countries to
participate in the full range of WTO negotiations and activities
agreed to in Doha.”254 In the agricultural realm, the United
States is leading a drive to eliminate export subsidies within
five years.255
The United States position on measures designed to
provide affordable medication to treat AIDS and other
epidemics has been more ambiguous. The Doha Declaration set
a December 2002 deadline by which the Council for TRIPS was
to have reached an agreement on a policy under which leastdeveloped
WTO
Members
could
import
generically
manufactured copies of patented pharmaceuticals.256 The
Council for TRIPS failed to meet that deadline amid reports of
U.S. objections to the number of diseases and eligible importing
nations that some WTO Members wanted to include in the
scheme for relaxing pharmaceutical patent protection.257 In the
250. Id. at ¶ 6.
251. Id. at ¶ 7.
252. Id. at ¶ 10.
253. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative,
United States Proposals for Liberalizing Trade in Services (July 1, 2002),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/07/02-63.pdf (last visited Jan.
23, 2003).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note
243, at ¶ 6.
257. RAYMOND W. COPSON, AIDS IN AFRICA, at CRS-1, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/hiv/ib10050aidsaf.pdf (last visited Jan. 25,
2003). The U.S. State Department reported that some (unspecified) WTO
Members sought to allow wealthier WTO Members onto the list of “poor
country epidemic” nations that were meant to be the focus of the Doha
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wake of that failure, the United States proposed an exception to
TRIPS Article 31 that would allow least-developed nations with
health epidemics to import generically manufactured drugs
from developing nations that currently provide patent
protection for the pharmaceuticals in question.258 While the
U.S. proposal indicated a willingness to ease patent protection
in some cases, it did not give explicit guidance as to which
specific drugs could be manufactured.259
Declaration’s emphasis on relaxations of patent protection allowable pursuant
to TRIPS Article 31. In addition, the State Department reported that some
WTO Members sought to expand the classes of drugs available for generic
manufacture and import to include drugs not designed for the treatment of
epidemic diseases (e.g., Viagra). See News Release, U.S. Department of State,
International Information Programs, U.S. Announces Interim HIV/AIDS Plan
for
Poor
Countries,
Dec.
20,
2002,
at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/02122002.htm (last visited Jan. 25,
2003).
258. TRIPS currently allows WTO Members to use a compulsory license to
import a generically manufactured drug from another country provided that
the exporting country has not granted a patent on that drug. The problem is
that TRIPS Article 31(f) currently prohibits a WTO Member that has granted
patent protection from generically producing a drug for export, even if the
importing country has a health epidemic and lacks the domestic infrastructure
to manufacture generic drugs. The U.S. proposal envisions either a dispute
resolution moratorium or a waiver of TRIPS Article 31(f) so that developing
nations with the capacity to produce generic drugs could export those drugs to
a least developed nation, even when the exporting nation has granted patent
protection. The U.S. proposal also takes pains to note that exporting nations
would be expected to “ensure that the medicines . . . are not diverted from the
Member for which they were intended, either by being diverted to other
markets or by leaking onto the domestic market of the exporting Member.”
Furthermore, the U.S. proposal indicates that an importing Member might
still owe some discounted measure of compensation to the patent holder
(although the licensing fees paid to the patent holder by the exporting nation
would be used to offset the total amount of compensation owed by the
importing Member). News Release, U.S. Department of State, International
Information Programs, A Second Communication from the United States of
America Relating to Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement
and
Public
Health,
at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/tripshealth020625.htm (last visited
Jan. 25, 2003).
259. The U.S. proposal suggests that any WTO Member with leastdeveloped nation status be presumed to have insufficient infrastructure to
produce its own generic pharmaceuticals, and thus would be allowed to import
generic drugs under the proposed exception to TRIPS Article 31(f). Developing
Members not designated as “high income countries” would also be eligible to
import generic drugs (thus Barbados, Brunei, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Israel,
Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Macao, Malta, Qatar, Singapore, Slovenia, Taiwan and
the United Arab Emirates would not be allowed to import generic
pharmaceuticals even in cases of health epidemics). The U.S. proposal does
provide a list of potential diseases that could qualify a Member for Article 31
exception (including ebola, African trypanosomiasis, cholera, dengue, typhoid,
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On August 30, 2003, the WTO General Council for TRIPS
resolved the dispute about implementing the Doha Declaration
by adopting a decision which essentially permitted a patent
exception rule to allow countries to produce medicine for export
in order to fulfill public health needs in countries that do not
have production capacities.260The decision dealt with U.S.
concerns that the patent exception rule would lead to the
distribution of generic medicines for non-infectious diseases
and with concerns about the re-export of such medicines to
other markets.261

and typhus fevers); it does not specify which pharmaceuticals could be
generically produced. See U.S. Announces Interim HIV/AIDS Plan for Poor
Countries, supra note 257.
260. Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and public health, TRIPS: Council for TRIPS, WTO Doc.,
WT/L/540,
at
¶
6
(Aug.
30,
2003),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm (last visited
Sept. 1, 2003).
261. It accomplishes this goal by imposing upon importing nation the
obligation to “take reasonable measures within their means. . . to prevent reexportation of the products that have actually been imported into their
territories under the system.” To the extent that developing nations lack the
capacity to enforce the re-exportation restrictions, they are authorized to call
upon developed country members to aid in enforcement. Id. at ¶ 4.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7 expressed concern for
the human rights implications of trends in world trade and
globalization. By adopting the resolution, the Sub-Commission
thus played a role in a broader effort to develop a human rights
approach to intellectual property protection, world trade, and
globalization.

